Eu sei, um programa de doutoramento é um lugar entusiasmante.
Neste post, destaco a contribuição do economista Ricardo Caballero que argumenta que o Paulo está errado em três pontos essenciais:
1. Causas da crise: Não foi política monetária.
The immediate consequence of the high demand for store-of-value instruments was a sustained decline in real interest rates. Conventional wisdom blames these low rates on loose monetary policy, but this position is difficult to reconcile with facts from the period of the so-called “Greenspan conundrum’’ – when tightening monetary policy had virtually no impact on long rates. In my view, the solution to the apparent conundrum is that low long rates were driven by the large demand for store-of-value instruments, not short-term monetary policy considerations.2. Houve erros de política mas essencialmente cometidos depois da crise ter começado.
Early on in the crisis, there was a nagging feeling that policy was behind the curve; then came the “exemplary punishment” (of shareholders) policy of Secretary Paulson during the Bear Stearns intervention, which significantly dented the chance of a private capital solution to the problem; and finally, the most devastating blow came during the failure to support Lehman. The latter unleashed a very different kind of recession, where uncertainty ravaged all forms of explicit and implicit financial insurance markets.3. Há espaço para a intervenção estatal através de garantias governamentais (e evitando a falência de algumas empresas).
In a nutshell, I have argued that, by now, fear has distorted the price of risk and its insurance to an extreme. In this context, it makes little sense to apply the ordinary recipe of restructuring and liquidation that works during normal times. The main role of the government should be to provide insurance against systemic events at non-Knightian prices. This recipe applies as much during as after the crisis.Vale a pena ler o artigo todo.
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